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INTRODUCTION
Richard R. Baxter*
Twenty-five or even fifteen years ago, a collection like this
of essays on the law of war would have been unthinkable.
In the wake of the Second World War, much was written
about the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials and about war crimes in
general. The adoption of the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims of 1949 brought a small flurry of articles
about the new treaties. Thereafter interest in all aspects of the
law of war fell away to the point of indifference or mild hostility.
The threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of states had been outlawed by Article
2(4) of the Charter, and the use of force was justified only if
undertaken in pursuance of Article 51 of the Charter, in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense,
or under an authorization or order from a competent organ of the
United Nations. The very concept of "war" was banished, because
"war" had been outlawed as an instrument of national policy. It
belonged, in the popular view, to a discredited theory that states
had a "right" to resort to war and to exercise belligerent "rights."
Moreover, there was a lingering fear that any attention given to
the law of war would tend to make war palatable, by suggesting
that individuals could still be protected amidst the barbarism of
war. At the most extreme, hostility to the law of war flowed
from revulsion against the very word "war."
The emphasis placed on the law of the Charter meant that,
even if the law of war could be accepted, the law would operate
in favor of the state resorting to the use of force lawfully, and
the state unlawfully employing force would be subject to the
obligations, but could not benefit from the rights conferred by the
law of war, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949. This
reversion to the theory of the "just war" was fundamentally incompatible with the view that belligerents should be treated on a
basis of equality and that the law should bring succor to the
"just" and "unjust" alike. In the long run, there was probably
more to be feared from this skewed operation of the law than from
indifference and neglect.
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In the intervening years, there were occasional monuments of
scholarly interest in the subject of the law of war. The most
notable of these in the common law world were the great treatises
of Julius Stone on Legal Controls of International Conflict and McDougal and Feliciano on Law and Minimum World Public Order.
The revival of interest in the law of war in the United States
owes its origin to the war in Vietnam more than to any other cause.
But the ground had been prepared by a growing awareness that
war or other forms of resort to the use of force had not in fact
been abolished by the Charter. On the contrary, the incidence
of armed conflict has been as high under the Charter as it had
been under the League of Nations Covenant. The conflict in the
Middle East, the Korean War, the Nigerian Civil War, and the
United Nations operation in the Congo, the outbreak of violence
between the People's Republic of China and India reminded the
world that international conflict was not a thing of the past and
that modern conflicts are often, in part at least, internal ones.
Work on human rights, particularly on the two Covenants on Civil
and Political Rights and on Economic and Social Rights, had
inspired people to think about human rights in time of war as
well as in time of peace. Indeed, the prod to the concern of the
United Nations with international humanitarian law and to the
activity of the International Committee of the Red Cross and of
the Swiss Government in preparing new treaties was the resolution on human rights in armed conflict adopted at the Tehran
Conference on Human Rights in 1968.
For the past 6 years, the Diplomatic Conference on International Humanitarian Law in Geneva and its two predecessor
Conferences of Government Experts have been attempting to
modernize the law of war through the medium of two Protocols
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, one dealing with international
armed conflicts, the other with noninternational armed conflicts.
A certain amount of scholarly attention has been directed to these
sessions, but much yet remains to be recorded and analyzed.
Interest in the law of war will undoubtedly continue to wax
and wane with the decades, but one must be thankful that we
are living in a period in which renewed attention is being given to
the measures that may be taken for the protection of the victims
of war. The present issue of the Case Western Reserve Journal of
InternationalLaw is on that account most welcome.

